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Abstract
A very common approach adopted to fight the increasing sophistication and
dangerousness of malware and hacking is to introduce more complex authen-
tication mechanisms. This approach, however, introduces additional cognitive
burdens for users and lowers the whole authentication mechanism acceptability
to the point of making it unusable. On the contrary, what is really needed to
fight the onslaught of automated attacks to users data and privacy is to first tell
human and computers apart and then distinguish among humans to guarantee
correct authentication. Such an approach is capable of completely thwarting
any automated attempt to achieve unwarranted access while it allows keeping
simple the mechanism dedicated to recognizing the legitimate user. This kind
of approach is behind the concept of Completely Automated Public Turing test
to tell Computers and Humans Apart (CAPTCHA), yet CAPTCHA leverages
cognitive capabilities, thus the increasing sophistication of computers calls for
more and more difficult cognitive tasks that make them either very long to solve
or very prone to false negatives.
We argue that this problem can be overcome by substituting the cogni-
tive component of CAPTCHA with a different property that programs cannot
mimic: the physical nature. In past work we have introduced the Completely Au-
tomated Public Physical test to tell Computer and Humans Apart (CAPPCHA)
as a way to enhance the PIN authentication method for mobile devices and
we have provided a proof of concept implementation. Similarly to CAPTCHA,
this mechanism can also be used to prevent automated programs from abusing
online services. However, to evaluate the real efficacy of the proposed scheme,
an extended empirical assessment of CAPPCHA is required as well as a com-
parison of CAPPCHA performance with the existing state of the art. To this
aim, in this paper we carry out an extensive experimental study on both the
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performance and the usability of CAPPCHA involving a high number of phys-
ical users, and we provide comparisons of CAPPCHA with existing flavors of
CAPTCHA.
Keywords: Security, Mobile, Usability, CAPTCHA, CAPPCHA
1. Introduction
Nowadays, mobile devices are used to carry out activities that use sensi-
tive personal information that should be accessed only by the legitimate device
owner. To protect such information, most of mobile devices support PINs as a
way to allow a quick, but weakly secure, user’s authentication mechanism. PINs
are both easy to use and time-savings as they require users to remember and
digit a very short number sequence, made by four to six digits at most. The key
space of these PINs could be still adequate for humans, but not for malware,
since they can easily carry out brute force attacks to PIN-based authentication
mechanisms, by pretending to be the legitimate user that taps the PIN on the
virtual keyboard.
The awareness of this problem has lead some researchers to introduce a new
dimension to the authentication taxonomy. This new dimension adopts Com-
pletely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart
(CAPTCHA) as an additional preliminary step to recognize the human user
before allowing her to insert the PIN digits. The rationale for this additional
security step derives from the observation that PIN-based mechanisms, as well
as other mobile authentication approaches (i.e., Unlock patterns), have been de-
vised to perform a human vs. human selection; hence the need to cull automated
programs (or bots) before they may be able to perform the actual attack while
being confused with human users by the system. Nonetheless, even if the idea
to filter out automated attacks before using a traditional authentication mech-
anism is effectively targeting the actual nature of the threats, the root of the
CAPTCHA concept, that is, the Turing test, targets the difference in cognitive
capabilities between humans and computers. Therefore, even if the CAPTCHA
concept introduces a new class of authentication methods that is orthogonal to
all the ones previously defined (i.e., authentication methods capable of perform-
ing a human vs. automated system separation), the discerning factor adopted
(i.e., a cognitive task) makes CAPTCHAs very often inconvenient and hard to
solve even for human subjects. This inconvenience is quickly turning into a lack
of usability as the sophistication of programs and the computational power of
computers allows them to tackle more and more complex cognitive tasks.
To tackle the open issues related to CAPTCHA, we propose to adopt as
the discerning factor telling computers and humans apart not intelligence or
cognitive capabilities in general but the physical nature. In the past, computers
input from the users was limited to keyboard and mouse, hence the measurement
of physical parameters was not convenient; however, the current generation of
mobile devices is endowed with a number of sensors capable of capturing several
different kinds of physical interaction. For this reason, we argue that it is
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possible to leverage these sensors to simply tell human and computers apart on
the basis of their capability (or inability) to physically interact with the device.
Leveraging smartphones and tablet computers sensors to devise new security
mechanisms capable of separating humans from computers is not new; however,
in all the past cases, the mechanisms required the users to perform some sort of
cognitive task that actually made it an implementation of the traditional Turing
test (CAPTCHA). We claim that, in order to tell humans and computers apart,
it is possible to leverage the mere physical nature of human subjects without
requiring them to tackle a complex cognitive task. Such a test can be defined as
a Completely Automated Public Physical test to tell Computers and Humans
Apart (CAPPCHA). An example implementation of CAPPCHA [51] requires
the user to arrange the mobile device in a specific position for being recognized as
a human. The rationale is that malware cannot physically move the device. For
this reason, if the sensor that recognizes the position (e.g., the accelerometer)
is secured (e.g., it is hosted in a Secure Element (SE)), a malware can neither
simulate a fake position for the device, nor it can physically move the device.
We claim that CAPPCHA is able to separate humans from computers while
maintaining a high level of usability and guaranteeing resilience to automated
attacks. Furthermore, CAPPCHA can be used in a twofold mode: 1) in com-
bination with a PIN authentication scheme to allow only human to access the
PIN challenge, or 2) it can be used alone, acting as a standard CAPTCHA (e.g.,
before posting comments on a blog, voting or sending an email).
To prove the efficacy and ease of use of CAPPCHA, we have devised two
practical implementations of a sensor-based CAPPCHA and we have com-
bined them with a simple PIN based authentication. Here, our contribution
is the discussion of the feasibility of CAPPCHA and a comparison in terms
of performance and usability with Password-based authentication methods and
CAPTCHA schemes available in literature. Regarding performance, we com-
pare existing mechanisms with CAPPCHA in terms of test completion times
and error rates. In terms of usability, we carry out and discuss an extended
study (based on more than 200 actual users) of the CAPPCHA scheme. Our
findings show that CAPPCHA is a promising solution as it is extremely easy
to understand and use, and it shows a high acceptance rate by the users. Fur-
thermore, it provides very high resilience to automated attacks and it does not
introduce cognitive overload on the users.
The paper is structured as follows: in Section 2 we provide an overview of
the related work; in Section 3 we describe the CAPPCHA scheme; in Section
4 we provide a security analysis of the proposed scheme against some well-
known types of attacks; in Section 5 we describe the experimental procedure,
the questionnaire we proposed to the users and we discuss our findings; finally, in
Section 6 we draw our conclusions and point out potential directions for future
work.
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2. Related work
Albeit static alphanumeric passwords and PIN codes are vulnerable to spy-
ware attacks [3], most of the current commercial applications still adopt these
methods to authenticate the user in sensitive transactions. Current approaches
to enhance the security of these widely adopted methods can be divided into
two categories, namely Password-based and CAPTCHA-based authentication
methods.
Password-based authentication methods. Proposals in this category may rely
either on requiring an additional secret value to remember or on adding some
overhead to the classic PIN/password authentication method. Kim et al. [4]
proposed a password authentication scheme, called FakePIN (Fig.1, left). In
their scheme, the user has to memorize an alphanumeric text and a password
direction as an additional secret value. To authenticate, the user is asked to
input a fake dummy key value which results from the combination of the original
password with the password direction. Whereas, the location of the keypad
letters is changed randomly at each authentication request in order to prevent
the attacker from replaying the user input acquired by shoulder-surfing or side
channel attacks. However, an attacker can discover the original password by
intersecting two sets of data acquired through recording attacks. Thus, this
scheme is not resilient against multiple recording attacks. Similar to FakePIN,
Yi et al. [5] propose PassWindow (Fig.1, right), thereby adding an additional
secret value, called pass-icon, to allow the user to enter their PIN in a secure
way. The user has to memorize the location of the pass-icon within a window.
The authentication is performed by moving the window on the virtual keypad
using multimodal sensors in such a way that the location of pass-icon moves over
the PIN. In this way, this mechanism increases the security of PIN codes against
side channel attacks and one time recording attacks. However, it is vulnerable
to multiple recording attacks and its user study shows that the authentication
speed is very low (i.e., 17,86 sec on average). Recently, Guerar el al. [6] proposed
a secure authentication mechanism against mobile malware, called BrightPass
(Fig.2, left). To authenticate, the user has to follow the alternating circle’s
brightness displayed on the mobile device to enter his PIN code. He should
insert a correct PIN digit when the circle looks bright and a misleading lie digit
whenever it looks dark. The main advantage of this scheme is that the user does
not need to memorize an additional secret value nor to solve a complex cognitive
task. In addition, their user study shows that it grants short authentication time
(i.e., 6.73 sec) and low error rates (i.e., 1.81% ).
CAPTCHA-based authentication methods. Proposals in this category require
the user to solve a challenge-response test, such as CAPTCHA, to filter out
malware before they can try to enter passwords or PINs. The most widely-
deployed form of CAPTCHA is text-based, where distorted texts are shown
as CAPTCHA images. A well-known example, designed by Ahn et al., is Re-
CAPTCHA [7] (Fig. 2, right). Their approach consists in using scanned words
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Figure 1: FakePIN and PassWindow scheme.
from old books that Optical Character Recognition (OCR) programs fail to rec-
ognize. Whereas, the challenge is a combination of an unknown word with a
control word whose content is known. If the user correctly recognizes the con-
trol word, it is assumed that his judgment about the other word is also valid.
However, the hardest category of this scheme has been recently broken by Good-
fellow et al. [8] with an accuracy of 99.8%. Instead of traditional approaches
that distinguish among localization, segmentation, and recognition steps, they
introduced a unified approach that integrates these three steps through a deep
convolutional neural network that operates directly on the image pixels. Then,
they apply it to transcribing synthetic distorted text from reCAPTCHA. In
addition to this security issue, a recent research [9] pointed out that existing
CAPTCHA schemes, including reCAPTCHA, are not suitable for mobile de-
vices. This is due to the lack of usability that frustrates the user and lead
to errors. In [48], authors suggested alternative input mechanisms aimed at
improving the usability of ReCaptcha on smartphone. However, the usability
comparison results show that participants prefer the existing ReCaptcha scheme,
that uses the virtual keyboard as the primary input.
Chow et al. [10] introduced the idea of Clickable CAPTCHA (Fig. 3, left) in
order to make CAPTCHAs suitable for mobile devices. Their approach consists
in combining multiple textual CAPTCHAs into a grid of clickable CAPTCHAs
(e.g. a 3-by-4 grid). The user is required to click on the grid elements that match
the challenge requirement. For example, the challenge can be the identification
of English words among non-English words in the grid. Thus, it requires the
selection of some elements in the grid, instead of traditional textual CAPTCHAs
that requires inputting a string of characters using the mobile keyboard, which
results to be challenging. Despite showing some advantages, this scheme has
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Figure 2: BrightPass and reCAPTCHA scheme
not been widely deployed.
Pequegnot et al. [11] proposed an authentication mechanism based on graph-
ical Turing test to increase the confidence in mobile transactions. Their mech-
anism consists of typing a secure code of three-digit displayed in a CAPTCHA,
in addition to the four-PIN digits. The secure code is randomly generated by a
Secure Element for each authentication session. In this way, the system prevents
mobile transactions submission by malware. However, this scheme is similar to
existing commercial text-based CAPTCHAs, which add noise and distortion to
CAPTCHAs to make them harder to break. Nevertheless, all of them have
been defeated with high percentages of accuracy through object-recognition
techniques, e.g., [8, 12, 13, 14] and [15]. In addition, using too much noise
and distortions makes them harder for humans to decipher as well, especially
on tiny screens.
An alternative to text-based CAPTCHA forms are image-based CAPTCHAs.
A typical CAPTCHA of this kind is Drawing CAPTCHA (Fig. 4, left). It has
been prposed by Shirali-Shahreza et al. [18] and it has been specifically de-
signed for mobile devices. In this scheme, numerous dots are displayed on a
screen with noisy background. To pass the CAPTCHA challenge, the user has
to connect the diamond-shaped dots to each other. Albeit easy and straight-
forward to use, this approach is not secure. In fact, Lin et al. [19] noticed
that the sizes of background dots and the noise square dots are smaller than
the diamond-shaped dots which can be filtered out by several erosion opera-
tions. Based on their observation, they proposed an image-processing technique
that breaks Drawing CAPTCHA with an accuracy of 75%. Another image-
based CAPTCHA is Asirra [16], which display 12 images of cats and dogs (Fig.
3, right) and asks the user to select all cat images among them. Their user
study shows that solving the Asirra challenge takes less than 30 seconds for
the 96.6% of humans, thereby making it convenient compared with text-based
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Figure 3: Clikable CAPTCHA and Asirra scheme.
CAPTCHAs. However, Golle [17] showed that this scheme is vulnerable to
machine learning attacks. Another proposal is NuCaptcha [50]. NuCaptcha
uses the animation of a series of characters, i.e., codewords, that the user has
to identify. The idea behind NuCaptcha is that the eye and the visual cortex
leverage the motion of the characters to clearly differentiate them both among
each others and from the background. In this way, the challenge proposed to
the user can be solved easily. In [48], Reynaga et al. shows that the usability of
NuCaptcha on smartphones is promising; however, this scheme has been broken
[52, 53].
Another recently introduced form of CAPTCHA is game-based CAPTCHA.
Liao et al. [20] proposed accCAPTCHA (Fig. 4, right), a CAPTCHA scheme
for mobile device based on game logic and human recognition. In this scheme,
the user is asked to play a simple rolling ball game or other well-known games
(e.g., enigma, racing game, . . . ). In accCAPTCHA, the motion operations are
carried out by moving the device in the case of accelerometer-enabled device or
by touching the screen in the other cases. Authors claimed that is difficult for
a malware to understand the meaning of these games and thus, to provide the
correct response. However, their user study shows that most gaming sessions
take a long time to pass the challenge (e.g., the Stack game: 47.3 sec., the
Rolling ball game: 25.2 sec., and the Racing game: 55 sec).
3. CAPPCHA in the current hardware context
We now discuss the hardware requirements for a secure implementation of
CAPPCHA and we prove its feasibility with current technologies. In order to
increase the security of PIN codes — which are used to access sensitive mobile
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Figure 4: Drawing CAPTCHA and accCAPTCHA scheme
services — against malware attacks, there exist industry-led initiatives pushing
the adoption of a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), a Secure Element
(SE) or both.
Secure Element (SE). The SE is a combination of hardware, software, interfaces
and protocols embedded in a mobile handset [21]. This component provides a
secure platform which enables an isolated execution environment and tamper
proof data storage for applications. This ensures a high level of security and
reliable identity management to each application, network and user [22].
SEs come in a variety of form factors. The most common form are embedded
Secure Elements (eSEs), Universal Integrated Circuit Cards (UICCs), and Se-
cure Memory Cards (Secure Micro SD) [23]. An eSE is a smart card embedded
into the device mainboard. A UICC is an advanced SIM card which can have
multiple applications hosted in it (e.g USIM, CSIM and ISIM applications) and
can communicate using the Internet Protocol (IP). In addition, it can support
multiple PIN codes. A Secure Micro SD holds an embedded chip which can be
used as a SE, along with a Flash memory.
According to Infineon, the adoption of SEs in smartphones is expected to
increase from 427 million units in 2015 to 1.6 billion in 2020 [24]. This develop-
ment is mainly driven by the growth of NFC-enabled applications (e.g., mobile
payment, transport and ticketing applications) that strongly rely on a secure el-
ement to achieve the expected level of security. Some examples of smartphones
that include a secure element are Galaxy S4/S6/S7, Iphone 6/7, Iphone plus
6/7, Iphone SE, Lenovo vibe P1 and Lenovo X3, just to cite a few.
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Trusted Execution Environment (TEE). A TEE is a secure, tamper-proof area
inside the smartphone CPU. This execution environment runs alongside but
isolated from the device main operating system (e.g., Android). It guarantees
that sensitive data are stored, processed and protected inside a fully trusted
environment. Its ability to offer safe execution of authorized software, known
as trusted applications, enables the TEE to enforce protection, confidentiality,
integrity and access rights on the data belonging to such trusted applications
[25]. Hence, the TEE isolates trusted applications and keeps them away from
any malware which might be downloaded and executed in the main operating
system. Another benefit of TEE is the ability to offer a trusted user interface
(UI) which ensures that the information displayed on the screen and entered by
the user are secure [26]. An example of a commercial deployment of TEE on
mobile devices is the ARM TrustZone technology [27]. In 2012, ARM announced
that it would include ARM TrustZone Technology in every processor design
they license to manufacturers [28]. As a result, nowadays many smartphones
are equipped with a processor with ARM TrustZone Technology (e.g., Galaxy
S3/S4/S5/S6, Nexus 4/5, Galaxy Nexus, Galaxy Note 4, Moto G, . . . ).
The TEE provides a more powerful processing speed capability and greater
accessible memory space than a SE. In addition, it supports more granular
user interface capabilities and peripheral connections than a traditional SE.
In contrast, the SE supports physical robustness and high tamper resistance
against side channel attacks [29]. The SE can work in combination with the
TEE. For example, a SE can be used to store proximity payment applications
— that require the highest level of security — in combination with a TEE that
filters access to the same applications.
3.1. Assumptions and threat model
Phone architecture. In this paper, we discuss two ways for implementing CAP-
PCHA, namely TEE-based CAPPCHA and SE-based CAPPCHA.
In TEE-based CAPPCHA, we assume that the user has a TEE-enabled
smartphone which is available in the most today’s smartphones. On the other
hand, in SE-based CAPPCHA, we assume that the smartphone uses a SE with
an embedded accelerometer sensor. SEs equipped with embedded sensors, such
as sweep sensors, are already commercially available thanks to the collaboration
between Fingerprint Cards (FPC) and Infineon Companies [30]. Furthermore,
Michel Willemin [31] recently released a prototype of a smart card (i.e., a SIM
card or a memory card) equipped with a motion sensor that acts as an ac-
celerometer. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that similar products will be
commercialized in the very near future. Moreover, this will allow CAPPCHA
to be implemented in all mobile devices that are not TEE-enabled.
Infection. To prove the resilience of our scheme, we assume that the user has
naively installed a malware from app stores or websites. We also assume that
the malware exploits a vulnerability in Android OS and is able to gain root
access on the device (see e.g. [1] and [2]). As stated above, we also assume that
the sensitive application is running in a TEE or a SE, and is protected with a
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common PIN code. Despite the strong isolation provided by TEE and SE to
protect sensitive applications, the malicious code running in Android OS can
steal the user’s PIN code (see e.g., [32, 33, 34, 35]) and replay this PIN in the
next authentication session to execute unwanted transactions without the user’s
consent [11].
3.2. CAPPCHA test concept
Figure 5: The CAPPCHA + PIN authentication method
Despite the variety of user authentication methods proposed in literature (see
Section 2), most of the current applications running on mobile devices still use
PIN codes to authenticate the user that aims to access sensitive services/data
or to perform security-critical transactions. This is due to their simplicity, ease
of remember and input. In order to enhance the security of PIN authentication
against mobile malware, we add a simple CAPPCHA test to the PIN entry
without affecting its usability. CAPPCHA requires the user only to tilt the
device to a specific angle whose value in degrees is displayed in the screen and to
hold it still in this position for one second to have access to the PIN pad (see Fig.
5). This approach is expected to be less burdening for the user in comparison
to solve complex cognitive tasks or memorizing additional secret values with
complicated input processes, as it happen in current literature proposals. The
rationale behind CAPPCHA is to use something that the user can do easily while
the malware cannot. We analyze the benefit of this approach by discussing a
TEE-based and a SE-based implementation of CAPPCHA.
TEE-based CAPPCHA with a random challenge angle (TEE-random). This method
uses a TEE, such as ARM TrustZone. The random challenge angle is generated
by the ARM TrustZone for each authentication session in order to prevent the
malware from simulating the current motion value, measured by the phone’s
accelerometer, in the next transaction.
SE-based CAPPCHA with a fixed challenge angle (SE-fixed). This method
uses a secure element with an embedded accelerometer sensor. In this case,
there is no need to generate a random challenge angle for each authentication
session because the sensitive application gets the motion value directly from
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the trusted hardware (i.e. accelerometer) that cannot be fooled by a rootkit
infecting the device. Thus, in this case a user would have the possibility to
choose the challenge angle that he is most comfortable with. It is important to
notice that, even if a malware could capture the current tilt value by using the
non-protected accelerometer in the device, it cannot feed any false value to the
software that interacts only with the accelerometer running in the SE.
3.3. Technical feasibility assessment
Both implementations enhance the security of PIN authentication against
mobile malware by asking the user to tilt the device to a fix or random an-
gle before entering his PIN code, e.g., when the user wants to either perform
sensitive transactions or execute any other mobile service that require authen-
tication. Albeit we are primarily focused on using CAPPCHA test to enhance
authentication on mobile devices, it is worth noticing that the same test on a
sensors endowed platform such as a smartphone, can be used in all the situations
in which CAPTCHA are currently used.
Both TEE-random and SE-fixed implementations are viable in the current
mobile ecosystem. In fact, most of the smartphones nowadays embeds either a
TEE or SEs. Thus, assuming the adoption of a TEE-enabled smartphone or a
smartphone that is equipped with a SE containing an embedded accelerometer
sensor is not a far-fetched. In the case of smartphones without TEE, a remov-
able SE such as SIM or Secure Memory Card with embedded accelerometer
sensor can be used. However, as this hardware currently is not yet commonly
available in the market, an alternative can be adopting the trusted sensor pro-
posed recently by Haider et al. [36]. In order to ensure integrity, authenticity
and non-repudiation guarantees on the sensed data, they uses physically unclon-
able functions (PUFs) which is already applied commercially (e.g., Intrinsic ID
[37], Verayo [38][39], Microsemi Smartfusion2 FPGAs [40], and NXP SmartMX2
[41]). A PUF is an integrated circuit that serves as a hardware security primi-
tive thanks to its complexity and the high level of unpredictability of the output
[42]. In [36], authors argue that their PUF-based design is lightweight, has im-
proved physical security, and requires no modifications in the sensor hardware
as it happens for TPM-based solutions (e.g., [43, 44]). However, evaluating the
security granted by CAPPCHA implementation with PUF is out of the scope
of this paper.
4. Security analysis
Since CAPPCHA is basically a way to enhance the PIN authentication on
mobile devices, in this section we discuss the treat model for CAPPCHA with
PIN, according to different classes of threats related to the authentication on
mobile devices.
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4.1. Brute Force attacks
One of the main security issues of PIN authentication are brute force attacks
where an attacker tries all possible character combinations until the password is
found. The proposed scheme involves presenting a problem challenge that hu-
mans can solve easily but would be impossible for a computer program. In the
TEE-random case, the randomization of the challenge angle for each authen-
tication session prevents the automated process of iterating through the entire
circle space.
In the SE-fixed case, the use of the secure element with an embedded sen-
sor prevents the automated process from any authentication attempt, thereby
avoiding successful brute force attacks. This is due to the fact that malicious
codes cannot feed false data into the authentication process as it relies on the
sensor embedded into the secure element. Thus, the proposed scheme is resilient
against brute force attack.
4.2. Side channel attacks
Side channel attacks aim at stealing user’s keystrokes, even when strong iso-
lation is applied, by trying to get or infer the user input from other components.
More specifically, these attacks leverages resources that are shared between the
mobile OS and the trusted OS, such as the accelerometer [32], the camera and
the microphone [33], the Gyroscope [34, 35], etc.
In the TEE-random case, the usage of TEE prevents side channel attacks
through the randomization of the challenge angle for each authentication session.
In this way, the current motion value, measured by the accelerometer, cannot
be used in the next transaction. Thus, stealing the response in the current
challenge is useless since the malicious code is unable to solve the challenge.
In the SE-fixed case, the SE provides protection against side channel attack
even without randomizing the challenge angle. This is due to the fact that
CAPPCHA measures the motion value from trusted hardware and this value
cannot be changed by the malicious code even if it has root access to the device:
instead, it can be changed only when the user physically moves the device.
Hence, the proposed scheme grants security against side channel attacks.
4.3. Recording attacks
The problem of mobile malware has been aggravated by the introduction of
recording attacks. In addition to inferring the user’s touch coordinates, current
recording attacks are able to record the entire authentication screen [46], thereby
making hard to protect against this class of attacks. However, in the TEE-
random, leveraging a TEE-enabled device when users interact with the Trusted
OS, the Android OS cannot access the screen [33] and, thus, a secure input
path to the user is provided and the malicious code cannot take screenshots
to reveal the challenge angle. Therefore, the TEE-random is resilient against
recording attacks. In the SE-fixed case, when using the secure element instead
of TEE, a malware having root access to the device could take a screenshot
and reveal the challenge angle since the SE does not provide a secure access to
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the screen. However, this would be useless because, even if it knows the value
of the challenge, the malware cannot bypass the measurements taken by the
accelerometer inside the secure element, thus it cannot fool the authentication
process into believing that the phone has been tilted to the correct angle.
5. Experimental results
The time granularity at which a security check has to be done, is not an
intrinsic of the check itself: it depends on the level of security you want to en-
force. As an example, in a computer system you only provide your credentials
at the beginning of the session, but if you engage in a critical activity (e.g.,
banking) your credentials are tested again (maybe even with a stronger mech-
anism). Obviously, a very awkward and intrusive mechanism will not call for
frequent use possibly jeopardizing the whole system security, while a very sim-
ple and pleasant scheme lend itself to frequent usage, with a better chance to
secure the system from intrusions. For these reasons, designing a new authen-
tication mechanism requires taking into consideration both computer security
and usability/user friendliness.
Therefore, in this section we describe an experiment that allows 1) to eval-
uate the usability of CAPPCHA and 2) to compare it to other existing mech-
anisms. Before we describe the experiment in details, it is important to clarify
some important facts. First, CAPPCHA, exactly as CAPTCHA, is not, in
itself, an authentication mechanism; on the contrary, it is a bot-culling mech-
anism, i.e., a mechanism targeted at pointing out automated programs (bots)
among human users. Therefore, we compared CAPPCHA directly with other
bot-culling schemes, but in order to make a fair comparison with full authenti-
cation schemes that declare to be bot-proof by themselves, we have measured
a two-stages activity composed by solving CAPPCHA first and then providing
a PIN; this two-stage activity constitutes an actual bot-proof authentication
mechanism and is thus comparable with other authentication schemes. Second,
average usage time and error rates of existing authentication schemes are ex-
tracted from the relevant literature; we have checked the references publications
and the sources get reliable values; however, average values may not have been
calculated exactly the same way for each scheme (e.g., inclusion or exclusion of
outliers). Nonetheless, even with these differences, the experiments described
in the relevant literature provide a basis for a meaningful comparison of the
CAPPCHA approach with other existing solutions. Third, in order to evalu-
ate the usability of CAPPCHA, the underlying hardware requirements are not
relevant while the important part is only what changes in the user perception.
Hence, the fact that CAPPCHA is TEE or SE based is meaningless from the
usability point of view, while it is important to distinguish between CAPPCHA
that proposes a random angle from the one that proposes an a-priori known
angle. Nonetheless, to maintain a uniform naming, we will continue to identify
the different schemes as TEE-random and SE-fixed (see Sect. 3.2 for details).
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Participants. We recruited 200 volunteers among students at the University of
Genoa. The age of the participants to the study ranges from 19 to 23, among the
participants 47 are females, while 153 are males. Some participants preferred
to use their own smartphone, while many others used the smartphones that
we provided for the test. The reason behind the choice to use a smartphone
different from the user’s own is the desire to avoid installing additional (in
the users perception potentially disruptive) software on a device considered a
precious tool both for business and for daily life in general.
Procedure. Before starting the test, the CAPPCHA mechanism was explained
in details to all users. Then, they were asked to test the application until
they felt familiar with the concept. Due to the simplicity of the challenge, most
participants did not have to perform more than two tests to get acquainted with
the mechanism. Afterwards, participants were asked to solve the challenge ten
times for both CAPPCHA implementation configurations (i.e., TEE-random
and SE-fixed). Thus, our results are based on 2000 CAPPCHA solution +
PIN entry for each configuration. The challenge time (i.e. CAPPCHA test
time) has been measured from the start of the application to the successuful
solution of the challenge, while the authentication time has been taken in two
steps: from the start to the solution of the challenge and the from the solution
of the challenge to the completion of PIN entry. The logged data stored on
the smartphones were used to calculate the average challenge time per user.
Relevant statistical parameters, including confidence intervals, of the measured
timings are presented. Once participants have completed the test, a satisfaction
survey was provided to each participant in order to collect the participants’
evaluation for the CAPPCHA test. Then, the users were invited to answer
to the questionnaire and note their comments as well as any problem they
encountered. The whole set of ratings and comments constitutes our evaluation
of the global usability of CAPPCHA.
The user study has been carried out in a controlled environment in order to
observe the participants spontaneous behavior in holding the smartphone while
solving the challenge. Furthermore, the controlled environment allowed us to
collect the paper-based questionnaires. The whole anonymous collection of the
votes as well as the average CAPPCHA, PIN and CAPPCHA + PIN solution
time is available at http://geas.dei.unipd.it/CAPPCHASurvey2016.pdf.
Equipment and software. Each CAPPCHA implementation has its own hard-
ware requirements, i.e., a TEE-enabled smartphone (for TEE-random) or a SE
with embedded accelerometer (for SE-fixed). However, the actual presence of
the hardware that is required to make the solution secure is meaningless from
the usability point of view; thus, we implemented an app able to work on any
smartphone with no dependencies from the actual presence of secure hardware.
When implementing the CAPPCHA test, it is important to take into consider-
ation that humans cannot hold their hands perfectly still; this is why we used
a small green line representing an angle range (see Fig. 5) as a challenge.
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5.1. Performance Comparison
Table 1: Values and Statistical Parameters for SE-fixed CAPPCHA
CAPPCHA PIN CAPPCHA+PIN
Average 1,80 1,00 2,79
Min 1,57 0,53 2,16
Max 2,09 1,35 3,30
Var 0,01 0,03 0,04
StDev 0,10 0,17 0,20
Conf Int alpha 0.05 0,01 0,02 0,03
Conf Int alpha 0.01 0,02 0,03 0,04
Table 2: Values and Statistical Parameters for TEE-random CAPPCHA
CAPPCHA PIN CAPPCHA+PIN
Average 2.86 1.00 3.86
Min 2.29 0.53 3.16
Max 3.50 1.35 4.71
Var 0.06 0.03 0.10
StDev 0.25 0.17 0.32
Conf Int alpha 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.04
Conf Int alpha 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.06
Table 1 and Table 2 show the experimental results together with their sta-
tistical parameters, while Fig. 6a and Fig. 6b show the box plots of the average
timings. As we stated before, the numbers provided in these table and figure
summarize the result of an experimental campaign comprising 4000 CAPPCHA
and PIN solving instances.
Table 3 allows comparing the average authentication time and error rate of
the proposed authentication scheme (i.e., CAPPCHA + PIN) to other authen-
tication methods that try to enhance the security of the PIN code by adding an
additional secret value or an overhead. Table 4, on the contrary, allows com-
paring the average challenge time and the error rate of CAPPCHA to other
schemes targeted at preventing automated attacks from reaching a subsequent
stage by means of challenge/response tests.
5.1.1. Authentication Schemes
In this subsection we analyze the performance of the authentication schemes
on the basis of the time that users need to successfully complete the authenti-
cation and the rate of failed authentications. FakePin and PassWindow both
have an average solution time that is three to four times longer than the cou-
pling of CAPPCHA and a PIN. BrightPass, while much faster that the other
two schemes, still requires a solution time that is, in the average, twice the one
required by SE-fixed CAPPCHA + PIN and about 170% than the one required
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(a) SE-fixed CAPPCHA (b) TEE-based CAPPCHA
Figure 6: Box Plot for the average times of CAPPCHA solution, PIN entry and full CAPPCHA
+ PIN authentication
Table 3: User test results from different systems. Results are taken from referenced papers.
Authentication method Authentication time (s) Error Rate (%)
FakePin [4] 14.13 4.7
PassWindow [5] 17.86 4
BrightPass [6] 6.73 1.81
TEE-random CAPPCHA + PIN 3.86 0
SE-fixed CAPPCHA + PIN 2.79 0
by TEE-random CAPPCHA + PIN. Furthermore, even if we have no informa-
tion about the confidence interval of the average values for the other schemes,
we can observe that the values are all and by far out of the confidence interval
of CAPPCHA + PIN measurements.
In terms of error rates, CAPPCHA + PIN is again stronger than the other
three schemes and the users in our experiment never failed an authentication
attempt, while all the other showed a non-zero error rate. The absolute absence
of errors in the CAPPCHA + PIN scheme is due to the combination of two
factors: first, our implementation of CAPPCHA cannot fail, it may only take
a longer time to complete; second, entering a PIN has become a very natural
operation for the users.
5.1.2. Bot-culling Schemes
We now analyze the performance of the different bot-culling schemes. Nu-
captcha [50], despite its security issues, requires a short time to solve the chal-
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lenge and guarantees a low error rate, w.r.t. the other forms of CAPTCHAs.
In the case of Clickable Captcha [10], we notice that familiarity with the En-
glish language is a discriminating parameter when evaluating both the time
required to complete the challenge and the error rate; this is rather obvious
when we consider the linguistic nature of the challenge. Similarly to Clickable
Captcha, ReCaptcha [7] suffers from language dependencies, as well as usability
issues related to the addition of distorted text and the use of a small keyboard
for the input. Asirra [16] solves some usability issues related to Text-based
CAPTCHAs; however, it is ill suited to mobile devices as visualization prob-
lems when displaying images on small screens generate longer solution times
and increase the error rate. Similar to CAPPCHA, AccCaptcha [20] uses the
physical interaction with the device to solve the challenge. However, it takes
a long time and has a high error rate compared to CAPPCHA; this is due to
the fact that CAPPCHA does not require any cognitive tasks and one simple
gesture is enough to solve the challenge. Furthermore, it is important to notice
that the CAPPCHA mechanism we implemented cannot lead to authentication
errors (false negatives); it may only delay the successful completion of the chal-
lenge. The experimentation with both implementations (i.e., TEE-random and
SE-fixed) allowed us to notice that setting the authentication angle to the user’s
preferred value results in shorter challenge times. However, we also observed
that allowing users to select a preferred angle resulted always in a request for
a small rotation. Therefore, it is possible that the shorter time is not due to a
motor memory effect but just to a gesture that is simpler to perform.
As shown in Table 4, CAPPCHA has by far the fastest solution time and
the lowest error rates among all the evaluated schemes. We argue that the
main reason at the basis this results must be found in the simplicity and in
the nature of the CAPPCHA challenge. In fact, the user has only to perform
a simple motor task, namely tilting the device to a specific degree, instead of
solving complex cognitive tasks. In addition to that, the CAPPCHA test is
designed to overcome the usability issues of Text-based CAPTCHA or Image-
based CAPTCHA. For example, CAPPCHA is language independent and does
not require text-entry in a small button virtual keyboard or zooming images to
solve the challenge. Furthermore, it is based on a simple gesture rather than
cognitive tasks that humans perceive as hard and annoying to solve. For all of
these reasons and because of the results of the security analysis we performed
in Section 4, we claim that the proposed schema improves the global level of
security while remaining fast and easy to use.
5.2. Survey of Participants Perception of Our Scheme
The questions used in this user study has been inspired from a recent survey
performed by Reynaga et al. [48] on usability of CAPTCHAs on smartphones.
The questions were provided to participants as follows:
1. Acc: It was easy to accurately tilt the device to the challenge degree.
2. Und: The challenge was easy to understand.
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Table 4: User test results taken from the referenced papers
Challenge/Response
tests
Test features
Avg. challenge
time (s)
Error rate
(%)
Clickable Captcha [10]
Subjects familiar
with English
11.1 0
Subjects not familiar
with English
18.2 10 - 20
Acc Captcha [20]
Stack Game 47.3 33
Rolling Ball Game 25.2 22
Racing Game 55 4
NuCaptcha [48] 8.5 2
ReCaptcha [48] 25.5 9
Assira [48] 29.2 19
CAPPCHA test
TEE-random 2.9 0
SE-fixed 1.8 0
3. Mem: If I did not use this mechanism for a few months, I would still
remember how to solve the challenge
4. Pleas: This CAPPCHA mechanism was pleasant to use.
5. Solv: I found it easy to tilt the device to the challenge degree.
6. Suit: I found CAPPCHA mechanism well suited for the smartphone.
7. Pref: On a smartphone, I would prefer using the CAPPCHA mechanism
compared to other CAPTCHAs.
8. Input: The input mechanism is better than traditional input mechanisms
(e.g., virtual keyboard).
Participants were asked to rate each statement from 1 (Strongly Disagree)
to 10 (Strongly Agree). Table 5 shows the average value of the ratings of par-
ticipants and the statistical parameters of our collection of data. In Fig. 7 it is
possible to see the box plot of the scores we collected.
Table 5: Average Users’ Score and Statistical Parameters
Acc Und Mem Plea Solv Suit Pref Input
AVERAGE 9.11 9.56 9.72 9.44 8.97 9.65 9.56 9.16
MIN 6.00 6.00 7.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00
MAX 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
VAR.P 1.28 0.76 0.39 0.82 1.59 0.56 0.67 1.27
STDEV.P 1.13 0.87 0.63 0.90 1.26 0.75 0.82 1.13
Conf Int alpha 0.05 0.16 0.12 0.09 0.13 0.17 0.10 0.11 0.16
Conf Int alpha 0.01 0.21 0.16 0.11 0.16 0.23 0.14 0.15 0.21
We notice that all statements were scored positively from all participants.
The participants generally found the CAPPCHA mechanism very easy to un-
derstand and to use. All of them stated that they would be able to remember
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Figure 7: Box Plot for Average Users’ Score
the concept behind the challenge easily even months later because the challenge
is simple and does not require complex cognitive tasks. In addition, they found
it well suited to the smartphone form factor, as it does not require text input
using small virtual keyboard or to zoom the screen to recognize images or dis-
torted text. All these features let participants express high ratings in preferring
the CAPPCHA mechanism w.r.t. other CAPTCHA schemes.
In order to know which configuration the users prefer and to further enhance
CAPPCHA, we added the following questions:
1. Preferred angle: which angle do you prefer to tilt the device to it?
2. Randomization: do you prefer the CAPPCHA test with a fixed preferred
angle as challenge, a random angle or there is no difference?
Most participants stated that they would prefer small fixed angles for the
challenge (e.g ±30, ±45, ±60). However, the main reason to choose the fixed
angle challenge was the difficulty encountered when tilting the smartphone to a
challenge degree above 90° or below -90°. Thus, a focused comparison between
the fixed angle case and the random angle case limited to small angles should
be performed to gain a more in depth understanding of this issue.
5.3. User comments
We invited participants to provide us comments regarding their experience
with CAPPCHA concept and test application by means of a free text section
in the survey. We also asked to provide suggestions on how to improve the
CAPPCHA test. Selected comment samples are shown in Table 6.
Many participant comments were related to the difficulty to tilt the smart-
phone to angles above 90° degrees or less than -90° degrees and they suggested
that the generated challenge angle should be within this range or even smaller.
Two participants suggested using arrows to indicate the rotation direction to
help them go directly in the right direction instead of trying both directions, as
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Table 6: Some Examples of User Comments
Sex Comments
F
Very easy and effortless
Unusable on a PC
One cannot make a mistake with this mechanism
M
The less tilting, the more comfortable users would be
Angles above 90° degrees and less than -90° degrees are non practical
as well as annoying
M
Quick, generally easy to understand and use
It’s easy between -30° to 30°
M
It seems like a game to me
There is no way to make a mistake
M
Less tilting would be better
The easiest mechanism I used
F
Above 90° is definitely hard to solve
Very intuitive
Add arrows to indicate the rotation direction
Unfortunately, it cannot be used to authenticate on a PC
M
Easy to use
I will prefer this concept than other captchas
M
Fast and easy, it seems like steering wheel to me
Very good idea for people who have sight problems
and don’t like to use virtual keyboard on smartphone
noticed on their spontaneous behavior when solving the challenge. One partic-
ipant in the survey provided an interesting insight on the capability of CAP-
PCHA to overcome sight problems, stating that it could be very suitable for
sight impaired people. To evaluate his comment we asked the sight impaired
participants to take an additional round and solve the challenge without wear-
ing their glasses. All of them were able to solve the challenge successfully, while,
on the contrary, they stated that they need to wear their glasses to input text
using virtual keyboard. Hence, they recommend CAPPCHA as a promising
alternative to existing CAPTCHA schemes even for aging people.
5.4. Observations on participants’ behavior
Since the CAPPCHA mechanism is based on tilting the smartphone, the
observation of how participants spontaneously handle their smartphones to solve
the challenge is important as it directly impacts the ease with which some
challenges may be solved. According to our observations, participants basically
uses three different positions to handle their smartphones as depicted in Fig. 8.
Participants who used position (a) to handle their smartphones encountered
difficulties in tilting it to directions over 30° to left direction while holding the
smartphone in left hand, and vice-versa. This is due to the fact that their wrist
is already bent in order to hold the phone vertically. However, tilting the phone
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Figure 8: Positions of phone handling
to the right while holding it in the left hand, regardless of the challenge angle,
was comfortable for all participants in position (a).
Participants who used the second position (b) felt generally comfortable with
turning the device in both directions until 90°. We noticed that this was the
most comfortable way to use CAPPCHA. We also noticed that participants
that used both position (a) and (b), had to twist their entire arm when the
challenge angle is more than +90° degrees or less than -90° degrees which was
not comfortable and annoying to all participants.
Participants who used the third position (c) to handle their smartphones
used both their hands to tilt the smartphone to any challenge angle comfortably,
and without having to twist their arms. It is worth noticing that most of them
reported that the concept is more game-like or similar to a steering wheel.
5.5. A Focus on Age Related Differences
As our sample was very homogeneous in terms of users’ age, we cannot use
it to formulate any significant observation about the differences in usability that
users of different age categories may find in our scheme. To have a first level
evaluation of this topic, we decided to perform an additional set of tests with
a limited number of users with significant differences in age. The size of the
sample is 35 divided as follows: 3 users are in age range 15 − 19, while 13 are
in the 20− 29, 10 in the 30− 39 and 7 in the 40− 58 ones.
As this experiment is focused on detecting possible differences in users of dif-
ferent ages we proposed only the longest and apparently most difficult challenge,
i.e., the TEE-random one. The procedure adopted for this second experiment
was exactly the same we used for the previous one, thus we do not repeat here
a detailed description (see paragraph Procedure in Section 5 for the specific
details).
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Table 7: Votes and Solution Times Separated by Age Range
Acc Und Mem Plea Solv Suit Pref Input Time
15 to 19
AVERAGE 8,80 9,40 10,00 9,00 9,40 10,00 9,80 8,80 1,95
MIN 8,00 7,00 10,00 8,00 9,00 10,00 9,00 8,00 1,82
MAX 10,00 10,00 10,00 10,00 10,00 10,00 10,00 9,00 2,04
VAR.P 0,56 1,44 0,00 0,40 0,24 0,00 0,16 0,16 0,01
STDEV.P 0,75 1,20 0,00 0,63 0,49 0,00 0,40 0,40 0,08
ConfInt95 0,66 1,05 N.A. 0,55 0,43 N.A. 0,35 0,35 0,07
ConfInt99 0,86 1,38 N.A. 0,73 0,56 N.A. 0,46 0,46 0,09
20 to 29
AVERAGE 8,92 9,54 9,92 9,31 8,69 9,77 9,31 9,00 3,07
MIN 7,00 8,00 9,00 7,00 7,00 8,00 7,00 9,00 1,98
MAX 10,00 10,00 10,00 10,00 10,00 10,00 10,00 9,00 4,11
VAR.P 1,15 0,56 0,07 0,83 0,67 0,33 0,98 0,00 0,47
STDEV.P 1,07 0,75 0,27 0,91 0,82 0,58 0,99 0,00 0,68
ConfInt95 0,58 0,41 0,14 0,49 0,45 0,31 0,54 N.A. 0,37
ConfInt99 0,77 0,53 0,19 0,65 0,59 0,41 0,71 N.A. 0,49
30 to 39
AVERAGE 8,60 9,90 9,80 9,10 7,80 9,80 9,50 8,80 2,98
MIN 7,00 9,00 8,00 7,00 5,00 9,00 8,00 8,00 1,81
MAX 10,00 10,00 10,00 10,00 10,00 10,00 10,00 10,00 3,71
VAR.P 1,44 0,09 0,36 1,29 1,96 0,16 0,65 0,36 0,38
STDEV.P 1,20 0,30 0,60 1,14 1,40 0,40 0,81 0,60 0,61
ConfInt95 0,74 0,19 0,37 0,70 0,87 0,25 0,50 0,37 0,38
ConfInt99 0,98 0,24 0,49 0,93 1,14 0,33 0,66 0,49 0,50
40 to 60
AVERAGE 8,00 9,57 9,71 9,14 8,29 9,29 8,71 8,71 3,29
MIN 6,00 8,00 9,00 8,00 7,00 8,00 7,00 8,00 2,30
MAX 10,00 10,00 10,00 10,00 10,00 10,00 10,00 10,00 4,51
VAR.P 1,43 0,53 0,20 0,41 1,06 0,78 1,35 0,49 0,61
STDEV.P 1,20 0,73 0,45 0,64 1,03 0,88 1,16 0,70 0,78
ConfInt95 0,89 0,54 0,33 0,47 0,76 0,65 0,86 0,52 0,58
ConfInt99 1,16 0,71 0,44 0,62 1,00 0,86 1,13 0,68 0,76
In Table 7 we show both the averaged measurements of the time needed to
solve the CAPPCHA challenge and the averaged votes provided by the users,
together with the relevant statistical parameters.
In Fig. 9 and Fig. 10, it is possible to observe the graphical representation
of the votes separated by age range, where the error bars are dimensioned ac-
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Figure 9: Average Votes for Different Age Ranges (Accuracy, Understandability, Memorability,
Pleasantness)
cording to the confidence intervals with α equals to 0.01. Some of the voting
categories (e.g., suitability) are extremely regular and all the values for the dif-
ferent age ranges are contained in the confidence intervals; furthermore, even
the voting category that shows the largest difference between the maximum and
the minimum value (i.e., solvability) has such a strong overlap in the confidence
intervals of the different age ranges that we cannot claim any statistical evidence
of an age-related difference. For this reason, this focus study does not allow us
to identify any age-related significant difference in the perception that the users
have of the CAPPCHA scheme.
The only statistically significant difference we can spot with the data col-
lected in this focus is given by the CAPPCHA challenge solution timings. In
Fig. 11 you can observe the values for the different age ranges. In fact, while
the increase in solution time is not significant for all the users ages 20 and more,
teenagers showed the capability to solve the challenge in a time that is 33%
shorter that the one needed by the other users (i.e., one second less); further-
more, the confidence intervals of these mean values are very well separated and
corroborate the significance of this difference.
These facts allow us to conclude that, even if teenagers are definitely quicker
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Figure 10: Average Votes for Different Age Ranges (Solvability, Suitability, Preference, Input
Mechanism)
in solving the proposed CAPPCHA challenge, their perception of its usability
does not show any statistically significant difference from the one of older users.
Our experiments do not allow us to draw a conclusion about this phenomenon
and we plan to investigate it in more depth in future work.
6. Conclusion and Future Work
Authentication is always the first step in any security architecture, in fact,
until a system has managed to guarantee the identity of the user it cannot
perform any kind of access control. Traditional authentication mechanisms,
such as the static PIN/Password secret that is still the most commonly adopted
one, greatly suffer from the growing sophistication of malicious software and
the increasing computational power of computing platforms; thus, to mitigate
their vulnerability researchers have proposed a preliminary form of a Turing test
(CAPTCHA) to cull out the malware access attempts. CAPTCHA, however,
have proved to be cumbersome and generally ill suited to the task, as the growing
sophistication of the malicious software requires also increasing the complexity
of the cognitive task to be solved. We proposed a new way of culling out malware
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Figure 11: Average CAPPCHA challenge solution timings for Different Age Ranges
access attempts (CAPPCHA) that, leveraging the physical nature of humans
instead of their cognitive capabilities, does not introduces any cognitive overload
for the users. To test the feasibility of our approach we developed a CAPPCHA
scheme which asks users to tilt their devices to a specific angle to prove that
they are humans before giving them access to the screen where they can enter
their PINs.
The security analysis showed that the proposed scheme is resilient against
brute force attacks, side channel attacks and spyware-based recording attacks.
To evaluate the usability of our scheme we decided to perform an experiment
similar to the one used in usability surveys for CAPTCHA schemes available in
the literature, namely we performed the experiment described in [48] with a sig-
nificantly larger sample (more than 200 users). From a usability point-of-view,
all the users involved in the experiment described our scheme as very intuitive
and easy to use, thus CAPPCHA has the potential to replace CAPTCHA as
the mechanism to cull out malware before traditional authentication mecha-
nisms are used.
Despite the success of our experiment, the survey indicates that there are
some new directions that need to be explored in future work. First, while the
sample adopted was larger than the one used in other surveys, we should provide
one with a larger statistical significance also when different age ranges are taken
into account; in fact, the limited focus experiment we performed in addition
to the large one to try identifying correlations between age and perception of
our CAPPCHA scheme did not allow us to draw significant conclusions. Sec-
ondarily, the observation that a statically set, preferred angle of tilting resulted
in faster authentication has to be compared with randomization of the angle
in a smaller range to check if the effect we observed was due to some sort of
motor memory or simply to easier gestures. Furthermore, while CAPPCHA
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currently targets mobile devices for the availability of sophisticated sensors on
such a platform, several users suggested that porting it to traditional PCs would
greatly enhance its usefulness; thus, we need to explore how the combination of
a Trusted Execution Environment with physical sensors already present in the
PC (e.g. the movement sensor in the mouse) could be leveraged to implement
a CAPPCHA scheme. Finally, we need to study the usability of CAPPCHAs
for users with impairments, as an example, serious sight problems and parkin-
sonisms can prevent users from successfully complete the CAPPCHA test we
have implemented; thus, we need to study ways to test the physical nature of
the user that can cope with physical impairments due to age or illness.
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